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License to Cheat: Voluntary Regulation and Unethical Behavior 
 
Abstract 
While monitoring and regulation can be used to combat socially costly unethical conduct, their intended 
targets are often able to avoid regulation or hide their behavior. This surrenders at least part of the 
effectiveness of regulatory policies to firms’ and individuals’ decisions to voluntarily submit to 
regulation. We study individuals’ decisions to avoid monitoring or regulation and thus enhance their 
ability to engage in unethical conduct. We conduct a laboratory experiment in which participants engage 
in a competitive task and can decide between having the opportunity to misreport their performance or 
having their performance verified by an external monitor. To study the effect of social factors on the 
willingness to be subject to monitoring, we vary whether participants make this decision simultaneously 
with others or sequentially as well as whether the decision is private or public. Our results show that the 
opportunity to avoid being submitted to regulation produces more unethical conduct than situations in 
which regulation is either exogenously imposed or entirely absent.  
 
Keywords: ethical behavior; dishonesty; regulation; selection; social norms 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The popular and business press regularly reports instances of unethical conduct by firms and 
individuals. Recent examples from the business world include fraudulent and deceptive banking, 
marketing, and securities trading practices, such as those involving Barclay’s, Capital One, 
GlaxoSmithKline, and Bernard Madoff. These instances received considerable attention both for the 
seriousness of the ethical lapses involved and for their impact on economic and societal welfare. Tax 
fraud and avoidance by firms and individuals, believed to be commonplace, imply large revenue losses 
for governments and shift the fiscal burden elsewhere in society. In athletics, stunning individual 
achievements across many sports – e.g., cycling, baseball, and swimming – are often met with skepticism 
regarding the extent to which they resulted from the use of illicit performance-enhancing drugs. In 
academia, fraudulent research and student cheating pose serious challenges for the credibility of scientific 
inquiry and higher education. 
Given the breadth of decision domains in which actors face decisions to be regulated and the far-
reaching consequences of such unethical behavior, it is important to examine how it can best be 
discouraged. One powerful tool on which policymakers can rely is regulation in the form of monitoring  
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and sanctions. For example, the desire to limit predatory behavior and deceptive marketing practices on 
behalf of firms led to the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, a product of the 2010 
Dodd-Frank financial reform bill, which has the power to monitor firm practices and impose fines. Tax-
collection agencies are given considerable power to investigate financial information and impose financial 
or criminal sanctions for underreported income. In athletics, regulatory entities, such as the World Anti-
Doping Agency, possess considerable power to test for banned substances and impose or recommend 
serious penalties. Indeed, prior research demonstrates that stronger monitoring and sanctions can 
discourage unethical conduct, though sometimes with limited effectiveness (e.g., Andreoni, et al., 1998; 
Nagin, et al., 2002; Olken, 2007). 
One potential limitation of the effectiveness of regulation occurs when firms and individuals can 
influence the extent to which they are subject to rules and monitoring. For example, manufacturing firms 
confronted with varying state or national labor and environmental regulations may choose which set of 
regulations to follow by deciding where to locate (Levinson and Taylor, 2008; Hanna, 2010). Similarly, 
credit-card companies have historically incorporated in Delaware, which affords them the opportunity to 
avoid more stringent regulation elsewhere (see for example Ausubel, 1991). Firms also can give 
themselves the flexibility to behave unethically, as when deciding whether to voluntarily agree to be 
bound by a particular set of standards, such as the requirements of FairTrade or EPEAT green production.  
Along the same lines, Enron’s well-known switch from historical cost (book value) to mark-to-market 
(fair value) valuation and its decision to suspend its code of ethics gave the firm added flexibility to 
engage in financial malfeasance. 
Opportunities to influence the degree of regulation by which one is bound also exist at the 
individual level. An academic researcher may choose to submit research to journals with varying data 
availability and replication policies. A student may select universities or courses with varying oversight 
and policies to combat cheating. And a wealthy individual may choose to hide wealth from tax authorities 
by relying on bank accounts in countries with high degrees of banking secrecy. Similarly, during the 2012 
U.S. presidential election, Republican candidate Mitt Romney chose not to publicly release more than a 
year’s worth of tax returns, a decision that prevented public monitoring of his financial activities and 
potential conflicts of interest.  
Even when they make no explicit choice among regulatory regimes, individuals and firms may 
have other avenues through which they can avoid monitoring and regulation. For example, anti-doping 
efforts in athletics are regularly hampered by medical advances that make detection difficult or 
impossible, thereby giving athletes or teams who engage in doping the ability to avoid regulation and 
monitoring altogether. Lobbying efforts and regulatory capture by firms can allow them to create 
loopholes or entirely avoid the enforcement of regulation.  
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As these examples illustrate, regulation is often of limited effectiveness, not solely due to 
exogenous factors that make detection or enforcement difficult, but also because those who are supposed 
to be regulated may have the ability to determine how much regulation they face or even whether they 
face it at all. Thus, at least two types of choices may be critical in determining the degree to which 
unethical behavior occurs in contexts where it is possible. First, an individual or firm can choose to 
behave unethically, if given the opportunity. This kind of decision has been studied extensively, as we 
review below. Second, an individual or firm may be able to choose whether to have the opportunity to 
behave unethically, as in most of the cases discussed above. Despite the potential importance of these 
kinds of “voluntary regulation” choices, they have received relatively little research attention; similarly, 
the factors that influence “voluntary regulation” choices, and their ultimate consequences on unethical 
conduct, are not well researched.   
In this paper, we explicitly study the decision of whether to voluntarily submit to stricter 
regulation and the extent to which this decision affects subsequent unethical behavior. Mirroring many of 
the situations described above, in which firms or individuals can obtain a financial or competitive 
advantage by behaving unethically, we study such behavior in a zero-sum competitive setting in which 
unethical conduct advantages one party at the expense of another. And, to obtain high levels of control 
over the presence and nature of regulation and the underlying behavior, we use a laboratory experiment in 
which we can carefully vary features of the environment while keeping all else constant.  
Throughout the paper, we use the term “regulation” broadly, to refer to an effective form of 
monitoring and sanctions that prevents unethical conduct. For simplicity, we consider two extremes in 
terms of regulation: individuals’ behavior is either entirely unregulated, such that they have the freedom 
to act as unethically as they would like, or entirely regulated, in which case they have no opportunity to 
behave unethically. We distinguish between exogenous regulation, which is imposed on individuals by an 
outside entity (i.e., the experimenter) without opportunities for avoidance, and endogenous voluntary 
regulation, under which the same regulatory regime is present but each individual can decide whether his 
or her own behavior is subject to regulation.  
We focus on two major decisions that participants in our experiment make. First, we study their 
choice of regulation (when regulation is voluntary) and the factors that affect their willingness to be 
subject to regulation. Second, we study the ultimate unethical behavior following this initial choice – i.e., 
the extent to which they over-report their performance in order to obtain greater financial gains.  
In the experiment, participants perform a simple task and receive a payoff based on whether their 
resulting score is higher than that of another participant (cf. Gino, Ayal, and Ariely, 2009). In two 
baseline conditions, participants cannot choose whether an experimenter verifies the accuracy of their 
performance: in a mandatory-regulation condition, the performance of all participants is verified; in a no- 
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regulation condition, all participants are free to report any score, and none of the reported scores are 
verified. We compare the scores obtained in these two conditions with voluntary-regulation conditions in 
which we allow participants to choose, before they engage in the task, whether to have their scores 
verified. Thus, we observe participants’ decisions of whether to be regulated as well as the resulting score 
they obtain.  
To understand how psychological and social factors may influence regulation choice in the 
voluntary-regulation conditions, we also introduce treatments that vary two factors: (1) whether the 
decision is made privately (where a subject’s choice to be regulated is not observed by other participants) 
or publicly (where regulation choices are observed by the other participants), and (2) whether the decision 
is made simultaneously or sequentially. These treatments also allow us to examine how information about 
others’ regulation choices influences individuals’ decisions regarding whether to be regulated, as well as 
their resulting scores in the competitive task. 
Our results show that there is significantly more misreporting under voluntary regulation (where 
participants have a choice of whether to be regulated) than when they are either all submitted to 
mandatory regulation or when no opportunity for regulation exists. This is despite the fact that a 
significant proportion of participants opt to be regulated in the voluntary treatments. Thus, allowing 
individuals to voluntarily choose whether to be subject to regulation might lead to greater unethical 
behavior than when behavior is completely unregulated. We find that selection based on relative skill 
plays a role in determining who opts for regulation (such that those likely to perform worse on the 
competitive task opt to not be regulated) and that the choice to not be regulated appears to give 
participants greater license to cheat, relative to when regulation is entirely absent.  
We also examine whether the presence or absence of regulation in one context influences 
behavior in other domains. Keizer et al. (2008) find that disorderly and petty criminal behavior in one 
setting has a spillover effect that triggers more disorderly and petty criminal behavior in a second setting. 
Similar spillover effects may occur in the case of ethical behavior. To explore such potential “ethical 
spillovers,” we use a second non-skill based competitive task in which no regulation exists and 
participants can therefore report any score they wish. We find that misreporting of scores in this second 
task is affected by the presence or absence of regulation in the first task; specifically, our results show that 
any possibility of misreporting scores in the first task yields greater unethical conduct in the second task. 
That is, in terms of ethical spillovers to other contexts, having regulation that is avoidable (voluntary) 
yields similar outcomes as when regulation is entirely absent, and both conditions are worse than 
mandatory and inescapable regulation. 
In addition to contributing to the understudied behavior of regulation decisions, our findings have 
important practical implications. Unethical conduct itself is often difficult to observe or verify, but, in  
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many situations, the initial choice regarding whether to have the flexibility to behave unethically is much 
easier to observe. Our results suggest that policies that impose either no regulation or total regulation may 
be preferable to policies that allow for regulation that can be easily circumvented.
1 We also find that 
increasing the visibility of the choice to be regulated can be used as a tool to enhance the voluntary 
adoption of regulation and decrease subsequent unethical behavior. Finally, we show that a policymaker’s 
choices concerning the presence of regulation in one domain can affect behavior in other, unregulated 
contexts. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we review the relevant literature and 
develop hypotheses that we test in our experiment. In section 3, we describe the experimental design. In 
section 4, we present our results. We discuss the main findings and conclude in section 5. 
2. Relevant Literature and Hypotheses 
Partly because of its pervasiveness in organizations and society more broadly, unethical behavior 
has attracted the attention of scholars from various disciplines. Much of the research examines the causes 
and consequences of unethical behavior in economic, organizational, and political contexts (Gneezy 2005; 
Fisman and Gatti 2002; Gino, Ayal, and Ariely, 2009; Burks and Krupka 2012).  
Using evidence from both field and laboratory studies, this research generally explores the extent 
to which people behave unethically and the factors that influence the degree of unethical behavior when 
people have the opportunity to lie or cheat. For example, Carpenter, Matthew, and Schirm (2010) found 
that sabotage among coworkers is higher in tournaments than it is under piece-rate compensation. Pierce 
and Snyder (2008) showed that unethical conduct by automobile inspectors is influenced by the presence 
of unethical conduct in the organization where those inspectors work. Related research conducted in 
laboratory settings examines how individuals’ unethical behavior often arises through vertical 
specialization, which diffuses the responsibility for behaving unethically (Ellman and Pezanis-Christou, 
2010; Hamman, Weber, and Loewenstein, 2010). A growing body of research also notes the ways in 
which people are self-serving in their interpretation of what constitutes ethical behavior (for reviews, see 
Ayal and Gino, 2011; Dana, Loewenstein, and Weber, 2011). Finally, a substantial literature examines the 
effects of ethical norms or behavior among management and employees in firms, often relying on survey 
or field data (Jones and Kavanagh, 1996; Schminke et al., 2005; Trevino et al., 2008). 
One focus of research on unethical behavior has been to explore the conditions under which 
individuals behave dishonestly for (monetary) personal gain. For instance, Gneezy (2005) studied the 
extent to which a laboratory participant with private information will lie to an uninformed participant 
                                                 
1 One application of this is the concern over “carbon leakage,” or “…the fear that industrial activity and greenhouse-
gas emissions will ‘leak’ from economies with tough environmental rules to unregulated economies. A big point of 
concern in the U.S. climate debate, prompting many senators to call for tariffs on imports from countries without 
similar environmental legislation.” (Wall Street Journal Europe, 13 March 2008).  
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about which of two possible actions is more profitable. He found that people are sensitive to both their 
potential gains from a lie and to their counterparts’ potential losses (see also Croson 2005; Hurkens and 
Kartik, 2009; Sutter, 2009; Gibson, et al., forthcoming; Erat and Gneezy, forthcoming). Recent research 
also explores the conditions under which individuals lie about the outcome of a random process, such as a 
die roll, to gain more money from an experimenter (Gino and Ariely, 2012; Shalvi, et al., 2011; 
Fiscbacher and Heusi, 2008). Other recent work examines how misreporting a score on an individual 
piece-rate task is affected by social and organizational factors. For example, Gino and colleagues found 
that exposure to other people’s unethical behavior increases an individual’s dishonesty when the 
wrongdoer is an in-group member (Gino et al., 2009) or when the individual feels similar to the 
wrongdoer (Gino & Galinsky, 2012).
 2  
Similar to the above research, our study explores unethical behavior in situations where lying can 
yield better financial outcomes. Our specific focus is on the effectiveness of regulation and monitoring, 
particularly when these can be easily circumvented. That is, we study what happens when individuals 
have the opportunity to decide whether to voluntarily subject themselves to regulation that prevents 
misreporting. The predicted consequences of such voluntary regulation are unclear. Since our work is 
exploratory, we develop plausible hypotheses as a way of understanding alternative results that we might 
obtain. 
To generate our first hypothesis, we begin by noting that individuals who are given the choice to 
opt for “no regulation” have the same opportunity to behave unethically as those who are in a context 
where there is no possibility of regulation. This holds in our voluntary-regulation conditions, where any 
participant who wishes to misreport her score can forego regulation and do so. Therefore, if there are 
some individuals who are always willing to lie for money and others who are not, it follows that unethical 
behavior in a treatment where individuals are free to privately choose whether to be regulated will not 
differ from unethical behavior when the behavior of all individuals is unregulated.
3 Under voluntary 
regulation, those individuals who prefer to behave unethically will choose to be unregulated when offered 
the choice, and individuals who prefer to behave ethically will do so regardless of whether they are 
regulated. This yields our null hypothesis: 
H0(null): Under voluntary regulation, misreporting will be similar to that under no regulation. 
                                                 
2 Burks and Krupka (2012) find that alignment between one’s own views regarding ethical practices and those of 
one’s peers (in-group members) is correlated with ethical behavior. 
3 An implicit assumption is that regulation choices themselves are not subject to social pressure or consequences, 
which is true when they are made privately (as when a taxpayer secretly opens a bank account in a tax haven or an 
athlete privately obtains the ability to circumvent testing). In cases where the regulation choice is made publicly – as 
when a firm chooses to locate in a country with lax labor regulations or when a researcher opts to publish in journals 
with lax data-availability policies – social costs associated with the regulation choice may influence behavior. We 
address this possibility below and in our experiment.  
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The above null hypothesis simply states that voluntary regulation affords equal opportunity for 
unethical behavior as does the absence of regulation; this hypothesis serves as a benchmark against which 
to compare what actually happens when regulation is present but avoidable. However, if voluntary 
regulation leads to different outcomes than the mere absence of regulation, why might that be? We 
explore possible explanations for how the act of choosing regulation might give rise to different 
subsequent behaviors regarding cheating. 
The decision of whether to avoid regulation may be more readily observable to outsiders than 
cheating itself. For example, a student’s decision to cheat on an exam, when given the opportunity to do 
so, is typically unobservable. But the decision to select a university or courses with more lax misconduct 
enforcement is potentially observable by others and therefore more likely to be subject to social pressures. 
Similarly, a private firm that closes its books to external parties gains considerable flexibility for its 
behavior, but the decision to close the books can be publicly observed. Prior research finds that being 
observed by another person affects ethical conduct (Akerlof and Kranton, 2010; Jones and Kavanagh, 
1996; Gino et al., 2009; Gino, Gu, and Zhong, 2009; Goldstein et al., 2011; Ariely et al. 2009), as well as 
behavior in other contexts outside of ethical decision making, as shown both in psychology (e.g., Asch, 
1956; Kallgren et al., 2000; Haley and Fessler, 2005; Bateson et al., 2006; Burnham and Hare, 2007) and 
in economics (Charness et al., 2007; Rigdon et al., 2009).  
In our context, when the decision to be regulated is publicly observable, we predict this will 
increase the number of individuals opting to be regulated because of social pressure to opt for regulation. 
If fewer people choose to circumvent regulation (through a choice made publicly), the result is likely 
reduced unethical behavior relative to conditions where voluntary regulation choices are private.  
H1(social pressure): If voluntary regulation choices are made publicly, more individuals 
will opt to be regulated, and this increased regulation will result in less misreporting.  
Thus, for example, while U.S. presidential candidates are not required to publicly release tax returns, the 
fact that their decision to do so is public has generally led to greater openness to public monitoring and 
presumably less unethical behavior in tax reporting.  
In a similar vein, considerable research demonstrates that people are influenced by what they 
observe others doing (Deutsch and Gerard, 1955; Zey-Ferrell et al., 1979; Zey-Ferrell and Ferrell, 1982; 
Jones and Kavanagh, 1996; Brass et al., 1998; Schultz et al., 2007; Krupka and Weber, 2009; Bicchieri 
and Xiao, 2009; Gino & Galinsky, 2012). A person’s decision to be regulated may also be influenced by 
observing the frequency with which others opt for regulation. Drawing on the distinctions Deutsch and 
Gerard outline in their seminal 1955 paper on social influences, we describe this kind of influence as a 
social information influence, whereby people learn something about the frequency with which an action  
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is taken from observing others. When others take a particular action, an individual becomes more likely to 
make the same choice. Therefore, we predict that individuals’ voluntary-regulation choices will be 
influenced by the publicly observable regulation choices of earlier movers. Observing another person 
choose regulation will increase a participant’s likelihood of choosing regulation and reduce unethical 
behavior relative to when earlier movers choose to be unregulated.  
H2(social information): If voluntary-regulation choices are public and sequential, then 
individuals’ regulation choices will be influenced by early movers. These regulation choices 
will also determine the amount of misreporting. 
The above two hypotheses focus on social influences, whereby information – either about one’s 
own choice that is provided to others or about others’ choices that one receives prior to opting for or 
against regulation – affects the voluntary-regulation choice and subsequent unethical behavior. But the 
voluntary regulation decision may also interact with the subsequent decision to behave unethically in a 
manner that is not influenced by public information about behavior.  
For example, an individual’s initial decision regarding whether to abide by regulation might take 
place in a “cooler” emotional state, when the person does not feel the temptation or competitive pressure 
to behave unethically, or when this feeling of temptation is psychologically more “distant” and thus also 
less salient (Trope and Lieberman, 2010; Tenbrunsel, et al., 2011). In fact, as demonstrated by Mead et al. 
(2009), cheating is more likely to occur when people are in a “hot” state -- that is, when they are 
cognitively depleted or have little self-control. As a result, the individual may opt to be subject to 
regulation under the mistaken belief that she will behave ethically even without it. This means that some 
people, who would ultimately behave unethically if the temptation to cheat were psychologically “closer,” 
may initially opt to be regulated and thereby constrain their subsequent conduct. Consistent with this 
argument, psychological research has robustly demonstrated that individuals poorly anticipate what 
subsequent choices they will make (Diekmann et al., 2003; Woodzicka and LaFrance, 2001). Thus, 
committing in advance not to cheat, when it is easier to do so, may lead to less unethical conduct.
4  
Alternatively, it is also possible that the initial private decision of whether to be regulated would 
offer a psychological path to increased, rather than reduced, unethical behavior. If people view the initial 
voluntary-regulation decision as one with only minor ethical implications – since, after all, they can 
always report truthfully later – then they might find it easy to forgo regulation. However, having gone 
down the path of foregoing regulation, people may then find it psychologically easier to behave 
unethically. That is, people may view their initial decision regarding regulation as not very ethically 
                                                 
4 Consistent with this prediction, Sherman (1980) found that study participants over-predicted their own tendency to 
behave in a socially desirable manner (e.g., refusing to write an essay that advocated an opinion counter to their 
own), but these over-predictions were “self-erasing” in that participants subsequently tended to behave consistently 
with their own predictions.  
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important (“I’m not doing anything wrong by giving myself an option to cheat”), but may then 
subsequently rely on that decision as a way to guide their subsequent ethical choices (“Since I gave 
myself the option, I may as well use it”). In a similar way, psychological research has shown that an 
initial small act showing commitment to a course of action can facilitate subsequent larger acts (Freedman 
and Fraser, 1966).  
The two possibilities we discussed above suggest how voluntary regulation may affect subsequent 
unethical behavior even when an individual is unconcerned about others’ behavior or what others think of 
her own behavior. We test these possibilities in our “private” conditions, where participants do not 
observe others’ regulation choices. Since the above discussion yields two different directional predictions, 
our hypothesis posits an effect but leaves open the direction. 
H3(behavior facilitation): Private voluntary regulation will either increase or decrease 
unethical conduct relative to when regulation is absent. 
 
We now turn to describing the experimental design we use to test our hypotheses.  
3. Experimental Design 
Our experiment compares two conditions, one in which there is no regulation and one in which 
everyone is regulated (mandatory regulation), to conditions in which individuals can choose to avoid 
being regulated (voluntary regulation). To explore the influence of timing and social pressure on 
individuals’ regulation decisions, we conduct four variants of voluntary regulation. Specifically, we vary 
whether participants make regulation choices privately vs. publicly and simultaneously vs. sequentially. 
That is, the voluntary-regulation conditions use a 2 (private vs. public choice) X 2 (sequential vs. 
simultaneous choice) design. Therefore, the experiment employed six conditions in total, summarized in 
Table 1.  
Participants were recruited to the laboratory in groups of six. In all conditions, they completed a 
problem-solving task and self-scored their performance. In the no-regulation condition, participants self-
reported their scores on the problem-solving task, and the experimenter did not verify these scores. In the 
mandatory-regulation condition, participants reported their scores, and the experimenter verified their 
performance (as described in detail below).  
Insert Table 1 about here 
In four voluntary-regulation conditions, participants chose whether their self-reported score 
would be verified or not by the experimenter. All choices regarding whether to be regulated in the 
voluntary-regulation conditions were made prior to the competitive problem-solving task but after the 
experimenter explained this task in detail. An important aspect of our study design is that, in the case of  
 
10 
 
voluntary regulation, all participants had the opportunity to behave unethically. That is, any participants 
who selected not to be regulated had the same opportunity for unethical behavior as did participants in the 
conditions where there was (exogenously) no regulation.  
We recruited voluntary participants for a paid one-hour experiment from the participants’ pool of 
the Center for Behavioral Decision Research at Carnegie Mellon University. On average, participants 
received $14.56 as payment for their participation. A total of 276 individuals participated in 46 sessions 
consisting of six participants each.  
Upon arriving at the laboratory, participants were seated at one of six tables, which were distant 
enough from one another so that participants could not see each other’s choices during the study. Tables 
were numbered from 1 to 6. The study included two competitive constant-sum tasks, a risk task and a 
questionnaire. These tasks were completed one after another, and payments were not revealed until all 
tasks were completed. 
3.1. Task 1: Matrix Task 
As their first task, and the main task in our study, participants completed a competitive problem-
solving task, which has been used to measure unethical behavior in prior work (Mazar et al., 2008; Gino 
et al., 2009). Each participant received two sheets of paper: the first was a worksheet with 20 matrices, 
each containing a set of 12 three-digit numbers (e.g., 5.78). In this task, participants had four minutes to 
find two numbers in each matrix that summed to 10. Participants then reported how many matrices they 
solved. The time constraint is generally insufficient for participants to solve all 20 matrices. Our primary 
interest is in the extent of misreporting in this task.  
The second sheet was a collection slip on which participants reported their performance. After 
the four minutes had passed, participants folded their worksheet and placed it on their desk and then wrote 
down their performance score (i.e., the number of matrices they correctly solved) on their collection slip.  
Participants were paid for this task based on their own score and the score of one other, 
anonymous, participant. The experimenter randomly selected this participant from among the other 
participants in the same session. The experimenter compared pairs’ scores privately, so participants did 
not learn the identity of the other participant with whom they were paired. If the score of one participant 
in the randomly chosen pair was higher than the other person’s score, then the high scorer received $6, 
and the low scorer received $3. In the case of a tie, the experimenter flipped a coin to determine who in 
the pair received $6 and who received $3. 
We used this procedure so that cheating on the matrix task by over-reporting performance would 
be costly to another participant in the same session. This assures that the costs of cheating are salient, well 
understood, and meaningful to participants who are deciding whether to cheat. By contrast, in much 
related prior work (e.g., Fischbacher and Heusi, 2008; Gino et al., 2009), the costs of cheating were often  
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unclear, as participants would simply receive a higher payment from the experimenter when they lied 
about their performance on a problem-solving task, thus making unclear who would be impacted by their 
cheating, for are at least two reasons. First, the additional money that participants obtained was not clearly 
taken from an identifiable other; the money presumably was not the researcher’s own money, and it is not 
clear how else the money might be used if not to compensate the participant. Second, participants might 
have interpreted the research context as one in which the researcher wanted some participants to 
misreport, thus providing the plausible impression that the researcher’s purpose might have benefitted 
from misreporting. Therefore, we believe that our design, in which misreporting clearly creates an unfair 
advantage relative to another participant, represents an improvement in making misreporting more likely 
to be interpreted as unethical. 
In the mandatory-regulation condition, the experimenter verified participants’ score on the matrix 
task. The instructions informed participants that, later in the experiment, they would hand both the 
collection slip and the worksheet to the experimenter and that the experimenter would verify that the 
score was correct (and correct it if it was not) before determining the payment for each pair of 
participants. In the no-regulation condition, instead, there was no such verification of performance by the 
experimenter. In this condition, the instructions informed participants that, later in the experiment, they 
would only hand the collection slip to the experimenter and that the experimenter would use only the 
score on this slip to determine payment. Participants in the no-regulation condition could take their 
worksheet with them at the end of the experiment.  
In the voluntary regulation conditions, participants could choose whether or not they wanted the 
experimenter to verify their score. Participants were told, 
“You may choose one of two options for reporting your score: 
1. Green Reporting Option: You will report your own score at the end of the experiment and 
the experimenter will verify that your score is correct. You will hand in both your sheet with 
the 20 matrices and your Score Reporting Slip to the experimenter. The experimenter will 
verify the number of matrices that you have correctly solved. Your verified score will be 
compared to another participant’s score to determine your payment. 
2. Blue Reporting Option: You will report your own score at the end of the experiment but 
the experimenter will not verify that your score is correct. You will only hand in your Score 
Reporting Slip to the experimenter but you will not hand in the sheet with the 20 matrices. 
You are free to take it home with you. Your self-reported score will be compared to another 
participant’s score to determine your payment.” 
The way in which participants selected between the above reporting options varied across 
conditions. In particular, we manipulated choice visibility (public vs. private) and choice timing 
(simultaneous vs. sequential), leading to the following four voluntary-regulation conditions:   
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  Private-simultaneous: Participants selected the reporting option by privately choosing one of two 
boxes on their instruction sheet. Participants were instructed to do so at the same time. Following 
these choices, the experimenter went around the room and privately recorded each individual’s 
reporting option. 
  Private-sequential: Participants again made their reporting decisions privately by selecting a box 
on their instruction sheet. In this treatment, however, the experimenter, instructed participants to 
do so by turn (by having participants wait until the person ahead of them had recorded their 
choice). After all participants had selected a reporting option, the experimenter went around the 
room and privately recorded their choices. 
  Public-simultaneous: Participants all made their reporting decisions at the same time but were 
able to observe the reporting choices made by all other participants in their session after doing so. 
Prior to the session, we placed a blue and a green index card on each participant’s desk so that 
they could use them to indicate their choices in the public conditions by raising one of the two 
cards. When it was time to select a reporting option, participants privately chose one of the two 
cards, and then, publicly, each person simultaneously raised either the blue or green card so that 
everyone could see the frequency of each choice. 
  Public-sequential: Participants also indicated a reporting option by raising a card publicly. But, 
rather than making choices simultaneously, they proceeded one at a time, prompted by the 
experimenter, so that all participants could see the choices of others before them in the session. 
We note that, given our design and procedure, we were able to record participants’ true task 
performance only for those in the mandatory-regulation condition and for regulated participants in the 
voluntary-regulation conditions. We were not able to directly observe true task performance for 
unregulated participants in the voluntary-regulation conditions, since these participants had the 
opportunity to lie about their performance without leaving evidence of their actions. In fact, they could 
take home their worksheet with their real answers at the end of the study.  
3.2. Task 2: Die Roll 
 Upon completion of the first task, but before the experimenter determined the results of this task, 
participants completed a second competitive task in which all participants, regardless of what condition 
of the matrix task they were previously in, had the opportunity to misreport their score. We included this 
task to measure how the experience from the different treatments in the first task may spill over and affect 
unethical behavior in a second task, in which everyone has the opportunity to behave unethically due to 
the absence of regulation. 
Each subject received a die in a plastic cup. The experimenter asked participants to roll the die by 
placing their hand over the cup and shaking it. Next, participants privately wrote down the number  
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produced by the die roll. This number determined their score for this task. After recording their score, 
participants were asked to shake the cup again to change the position of the die. Thus, participants had the 
opportunity to misreport the outcome of the die roll.
5 
In the die-roll task, each participant was again randomly and anonymously matched with another 
participant in the room. It was made clear that this was a different participant than the one with whom the 
participant had been matched in the first task. Participants’ payment in this task again depended on their 
score and the other person’s score. As before, if the participant’s score was greater than the other person’s 
score, then the participant received $6. If it was lower, then the participant received $3. In the case of a 
tie, the experimenter flipped a coin to determine who in the pair received $6 and who received $3.  
3.3. Risk Task and Final Questionnaire  
As their third task, participants made choices that we used to assess their risk preferences, as a 
possible control for individual differences. Any payment they accumulated from this task was added to 
their other payoffs from the other parts of the experiment. We assessed individual risk preferences using 
Binswanger’s (1980) procedure. Participants were presented with eight options specified in different rows 
of a table printed for them on a piece of paper. Each option provided them with a payoff if the outcome of 
a coin flip was “Heads” and another payoff if it was “Tails.” Participants were asked to choose one of 
these options. The experimenter then went around the room and tossed a coin to decide which payment 
each participant received based on their decision. The row chosen by a participant provides an estimate of 
his or her risk preferences. 
As their last task in the study, participants then answered a questionnaire asking about their 
gender, age, occupational status, and personality. While they worked on the questionnaire, one of the two 
experimenters left the room to calculate participants’ payoffs. To compute payoffs, this experimenter used 
the collection slips from task 1 and task 2, together with the matrix sheet if the participant was to be 
regulated. Next, after participants completed the questionnaire, they each left the room one at a time to 
receive payment privately. 
4. Results 
Table 2 presents a summary of the main outcome variables from the matrix task across 
conditions, namely participants’ reported matrix scores and their voluntary regulation choices. Recall that 
in the no-regulation condition, the mean matrix score is a self-reported score that the experimenter did not 
verify; in the mandatory-regulation condition, the mean matrix score is the verified score; and in the 
voluntary-regulation condition, the mean matrix score includes both verified and unverified scores. Under 
                                                 
5 Our design is similar to the one employed by Fischbacher and Heusi (2008), in which participants privately roll a 
die and receive as payment what they report the die roll to be. Similar procedures in which participants can 
misreport the outcome of a random process like a die roll or a coin toss for personal gain have also been used in 
previous psychological research (e.g., Bateson, et al., 1999; Shalvi, et al., 2011; Gino and Ariely, 2012).  
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mandatory regulation, participants correctly completed, on average, 5.40 matrices (out of 20). However, 
when the experimenter did not verify the scores (no regulation), participants reported completing 9.07 
matrices on average. These means differ significantly in a t-test (t58 = 3.65, p < 0.001), and the 
distributions of scores differ significantly in a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test (z = 3.49, p < 
0.001). Therefore, giving everyone the opportunity to misreport resulted in higher reported scores. This 
result is consistent with prior research showing that when given the opportunity to cheat, people do cheat, 
even if only by a little bit and not to the maximum extent possible (Mazar et al., 2008; Gino et al., 2009). 
Insert Table 2 about here 
The remaining five rows of Table 2 report outcomes from the voluntary-regulation conditions, 
where participants could each choose whether or not they wanted to be regulated. We first pool all 
conditions with voluntary regulation and then report the results separately for each of the sub-treatments.  
4.1. Does voluntary regulation look like no regulation?  
Our null hypothesis predicted that, in the voluntary-regulation environment, scores on the matrix 
task would be similar to those when there is no regulation. This hypothesis is rejected in the data. The 
mean reported score pooled over all the voluntary-regulation conditions was 12.20 (row 3 in table 2), 
which is significantly higher than under no regulation (t244 = 2.94, p < 0.005). Again, the distributions also 
differ significantly (z = 2.74, p < 0.01). Thus, on aggregate, when participants can decide whether or not 
to be regulated, we observe more misreporting than when everyone is unregulated and has the opportunity 
to misreport. This is perhaps most surprising when one considers that 42% of the participants in the 
voluntary-regulation conditions opted for regulation.  
When we compare the separate sub-treatments with voluntary regulation to the no-regulation 
condition, we similarly observed higher reported scores in all of the four conditions in which participants 
could avoid regulation. In three of these cases, the mean reported scores are significantly higher than 
under no regulation (private-simultaneous: t82 = 3.88, p < 0.001; private-sequential: t82 = 3.99, p < 0.001; 
public-sequential: t82 = 2.10, p < 0.04), while in the public-simultaneous case, the mean reported scores 
are also higher, but the difference is not statistically significant (t82 = 1.05). 
4.2. Do public regulation choices lead to greater regulation?  
We hypothesized that more participants would opt to be regulated when voluntary-regulation 
choices are public rather than private and that this would result in less unethical conduct (H1). When 
participants make voluntary-regulation decisions publicly, they are indeed more likely to opt to be 
regulated (on average, 52.7% of the time) than when they make these decisions privately (on average, 
31.5%), with the two frequencies differing significantly (χ
2(1) = 10.04, p < 0.005). Therefore, even 
though the decision to avoid regulation does not necessarily imply unethical conduct, participants appear  
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concerned with the social image produced by having others know that they are forgoing opportunities to 
cheat. Turning to the reported scores, mean reported scores are lower when voluntary-regulation decisions 
are public than when they are private. In the two public conditions, the mean score is 10.82, which is 
lower than in the two private conditions (13.57). This difference in means is statistically significant (t214 = 
3.67, p < 0.001), as is the difference in distributions of scores (z = 3.57, p < 0.001). Therefore, consistent 
with H1, we observe that public voluntary-regulation decisions yield both greater regulation and less 
misreporting than when decisions are made privately.  
In addition to increasing the percentage of participants who choose to be regulated, the public 
condition also yields lower reported scores among those who choose to be unregulated. In Figure 1, we 
present reported scores in the voluntary-regulation conditions by whether a subject chose to be regulated 
or unregulated and by whether the regulation decision was made privately or publicly. For those 
participants who opted for no regulation, mean reported scores are significantly higher for those in private 
conditions than for those in public conditions (16.13 vs. 13.21, t123 = 3.35, p < 0.005). In contrast, there is 
no significant difference in mean reported scores for those participants opting for regulation in the private 
vs. public conditions (8.00 vs. 8.68, t89 = 0.75). This indicates that the decline in misreporting that we 
observe in the public conditions, relative to when regulation choices are private, is driven both by an 
increase in the percent of participants choosing to be regulated and by a decrease in misreporting even 
among those participants who are unregulated. This is also our first piece of evidence that the effects of 
voluntary regulation may go beyond simply affecting the frequency of misreporting, but may also affect 
the magnitude of misreporting by those who are unregulated. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
4.3. Are participants influenced by others’ regulation choices?  
We also hypothesized that, in the public-sequential condition, participants’ regulation choices and 
misreporting would be influenced by others’ earlier choices (H2). Comparing the frequency with which 
regulation was chosen in the public-sequential and public-simultaneous conditions in Table 2 reveals no 
statistically significant differences in the frequency with which participants opt for regulation (51.9% vs. 
53.7%, χ
2(1) = 0.037) or the resulting mean reported scores (11.39 vs. 10.26, t106 = 1.08). Therefore, there 
appears to be no change in aggregate behavior when public decisions are made simultaneously or 
sequentially. 
However, an influence of sequential decisions emerges when we explore the behavior of 
participants across positions in the experiment. Recall that the subject with ID#1 acted first, ID#2 second, 
and so forth. Therefore, we can consider the behavior of participants in a session by ID number as a way 
of discerning the hypothesized dynamic effects in the sequential-public treatment. Table 3 presents the  
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voluntary-regulation choices by subject ID (position) for all sessions in this treatment. We order the 
sessions by the regulation choice of the participant who moved first in each session. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
Table 3 reveals a considerable influence of earlier movers on subsequent regulation choices, 
consistent with our hypothesis. Given the overall frequency of 51.9% with which participants chose 
regulation in these treatments, we would expect two participants, selected at random and deciding 
independently, to make the same choice 50.1% of the time. Yet we find that in 77.8% of choices, a 
participant repeated the choice made by the previous participant, which differs significantly from the 
above expected proportion under independence (z = 3.71, p < 0.001). In fact, the influence of early 
movers is so strong that, in the four groups in which the first mover chose regulation (the gray columns in 
Table 3), 80% of the subsequent participant choices were for regulation. On the other hand, in the five 
groups in which the first mover opted not to be regulated (the white columns in table 3), only 32% of 
subsequent participants opted for regulation. 
The difference in the adoption of regulation by early movers also affects the scores subsequently 
reported in each session. In the four sessions in which the first mover opted to be regulated, the mean 
reported score was 9.7 (10.4 if we omit the first mover), while in the five groups in which the first mover 
chose no regulation it was 12.8 (12.0 if we omit the first mover). However, the difference, when we omit 
the first mover, is not statistically significant. 
4.4. Does private voluntary regulation affect unethical conduct? 
  The results presented above demonstrate that public voluntary-regulation decisions can affect 
unethical behavior, both through individuals’ concern about others knowing whether or not they opted for 
regulation and through individuals following the regulation choices made by earlier movers. We next 
study how unethical conduct is influenced by the possibility of forgoing regulation, even when voluntary 
regulation choices are made privately. In such cases, the social influences of being observed and of 
observing others discussed above are unlikely to play a role. Since all participants can give themselves the 
option to misreport, one might expect outcomes to be very similar to the no-regulation condition, making 
the private voluntary-regulation conditions the most likely to support our null hypothesis of no effect of 
voluntary regulation relative to no regulation. However, as we hypothesized earlier (H3), the act of first 
deciding whether one wants to have the opportunity to behave unethically may be psychologically distinct 
from simply having the opportunity to misreport. 
  From Table 2, we see that across both conditions with private voluntary regulation, 31.5% of 
participants opt to be regulated. This could either represent only those participants who would not 
misreport under no regulation (as in our null hypothesis) or some participants who would misreport under  
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no regulation but decide to constrain themselves under voluntary regulation. In either case, however, we 
might expect the resulting scores to be bounded above by those under no regulation (9.07). Instead, the 
mean score reported in the private conditions is 13.57 (private-simultaneous: 13.48, private-sequential: 
13.67), which is significantly higher (t136 = 4.17, p < 0.001). The distributions also differ between no 
regulation and private voluntary regulation (z = 3.99, p < 0.001). Therefore, we again find evidence 
contrary to the null hypothesis that voluntary regulation will yield similar outcomes to no regulation: in 
our data, allowing participants to choose to be regulated yields significantly higher misreporting, even 
though roughly one-third of participants choose to be regulated.  
4.5. Why is there greater unethical behavior under voluntary regulation? 
  The preceding result is somewhat surprising: If one-third of participants opt for regulation when 
doing so is a private decision, then why are mean reported scores higher than when no one is regulated? 
This suggests that, among those choosing to remain unregulated under voluntary regulation, misreporting 
is significantly higher. In this section, we attempt to shed light on what may be driving this result. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
  Table 4 presents the mean reported score, by condition, broken down by whether a subject was 
regulated or unregulated. In the two baseline conditions (no regulation, mandatory regulation), 
participants were either all regulated or unregulated, while in the voluntary-regulation conditions, each 
participant chose this for themselves. Interestingly, the mean reported scores are higher for participants 
under voluntary regulation, both in a comparison between those who chose not to be regulated and those 
who were in the mandatory no-regulation condition (14.94 vs. 9.07, t153 = 6.05, p < 0.001) and in a similar 
comparison between those who chose regulation and those subject to mandatory regulation (8.43 vs. 5.40, 
t119 = 3.46, p < 0.001).  
  This pattern of scores may have at least two explanations. First, regarding the change in scores of 
those who were regulated, whether voluntarily or mandatorily, those participants who opt for regulation 
when doing so is voluntary may tend to have higher-than-average ability on the task. Low-ability 
participants opt out of regulation at higher rates, which explains the increase in scores, from 5.40 to 8.43, 
among those who are regulated voluntarily. In short, a different group of participants is being regulated in 
the voluntary-regulation condition than in the mandatory-regulation condition.
6 Below, we explore the 
evidence for such selection based on differences in individuals’ ability.  
                                                 
6 Dohmen and Falk (2011) nicely demonstrate the impact of sorting, by productivity, in the context of varying 
output contracts. See also Schwieren and Weichselbaumer (2010), who find a tendency for low-ability types to cheat 
more in competitive tasks.  
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  The above phenomenon alone does not explain why average scores also increase for voluntarily 
unregulated participants. A second phenomenon appears to be that those participants choosing to be 
unregulated subsequently misreport to a higher degree than they would if they were forced to be 
unregulated. This pattern is consistent with a “license to cheat effect,” whereby choosing not to be 
regulated leads to greater misreporting than when no such choice is offered in the first place. We now turn 
to offering evidence for both of these effects. 
4.5.1. Selection effect 
  To identify selection effects in determining whether participants opt for regulation, we first 
identify whether any observable participant characteristics predict the decision to be regulated. Table 5 
reports the marginal effects from two probit regressions of the decision to be regulated, in the voluntary-
regulation conditions, on demographic characteristics obtained at the end of the experiment, as well as on 
a binary variable indicating whether the regulation decision was public.  
Insert Table 5 about here 
The four demographic variables in the first model are i) whether a participant is female, ii) a 
participant’s age, iii) whether a participant reports having at least one parent who graduated from college, 
and iv) whether a participant reports being religious. We also include, as a control, a variable for whether 
the regulation decision was made publicly (vs. privately). The second regression model also introduces 
binary variables to identify the most frequent college majors reported in our sample. Confirming our 
earlier analysis, if a participant’s regulation decision is public, then that participant is 24 percent more 
likely to opt for regulation. The only other variable that significantly predicts regulation is gender; 
females are roughly 18 percent less likely to opt for regulation than males. This suggests that some of the 
potential selection observed in Table 4 might be accounted for by the differential regulation behavior of 
females. 
  To explore whether selective adoption of regulation by gender might be at least partly responsible 
for the pattern of matrix scores we observe in Table 4, we consider the relative (reported) performance of 
males and females. Table 6 presents, by treatment, mean reported scores separately for males and 
females. Under mandatory regulation, we observe that females perform worse than men: the mean score 
is 6.94 for males and 3.64 for females, a difference that is statistically significant (t28 = 2.44, p = 0.02). 
The difference in performance under regulation might explain why women are less likely than men to opt 
for regulation (as we observed in Table 5).  
Insert Table 6 about here  
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Consistent with the idea that females are using the opportunity to misreport scores as a means of 
“catching up” with male scores, we see that in the no-regulation condition, the difference between male 
and female scores is small – in fact, reversed – and statistically insignificant. Thus, when females all have 
the opportunity to misreport, the gender gap in scores disappears. Moreover, when we consider the 
treatments with voluntary regulation, we see that the difference between male and female scores varies 
and that it tends to be smaller and less statistically significant in the private conditions, where there is less 
social pressure to adopt the regulation. Thus, consistent with the idea that disadvantaged individuals 
disproportionately opt to forgo regulation, we observe that females tend to be disadvantaged in the task, 
that they tend to forgo regulation in greater proportions, and that a lack of regulation allows them to 
overcome their disadvantage.  
4.5.2. “License to cheat” effect 
  In addition to the effect of selection on reported matrix scores, we also consider the possibility 
that the degree of misreporting is higher when participants opt for voluntary regulation. To do so, we 
attempt to identify the degree of additional misreporting when participants are unregulated voluntarily. 
  We first construct a rough measure of the predicted score a participant would obtain if regulated. 
We do this by considering all of the collected demographic variables and the extent to which they predict 
scores in the condition in which regulation is mandatory – i.e., when we know that scores are reported 
truthfully. We find one variable that reliable predicts scores: whether a participant is male or female (see 
Table 6). Using the gender variable, we construct a predicted score for each participant: 3.64 for female 
and 6.94 for males, a classification that accounts for 18 percent of the variance in actual scores.
7  
  Next, we compare the predicted “true” scores obtained above with the actual reported scores 
obtained in each treatment. Table 7 presents the mean difference between participants’ predicted and 
actual scores, by treatment and by whether or not the participant was regulated. The predicted scores 
represent the mean scores one would expect to observe in each case, under the assumption of no 
misreporting, after controlling for the gender composition of the sample producing those scores; the 
numbers in the table are the actual departure from this prediction.
8  
Insert Table 7 about here 
The first row of the table corresponds to the no-regulation condition and reveals that, on average, 
participants reported solving 3.56 more matrices than their predicted scores. This indicates that there was 
                                                 
7 The nature and significance of these results do not change if we use less reliable variables to generate predicted 
scores. For instance, including variables such as major and whether a subject’s parents attended college increases the 
variance explained in the initial model up to 50% but does not change the conclusion of our analysis in this section. 
8 Since the predicted scores were obtained from the exogenous regulation treatment, the difference is by definition 
zero, and we exclude that treatment from the table.  
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some misreporting relative to the case in which all participants were regulated. Across all voluntary-
regulation conditions, those participants who choose to be regulated reported solving 2.61 matrices more, 
on average, than their predicted scores. This increase is consistent with selection on (unobserved) ability, 
which we discussed above. 
  However, the most striking aspect of Table 7 is the average reported score of participants who 
were unregulated: these participants reported solving 9.56 more matrices, on average, than their predicted 
scores. This is over 2.5 times higher than when all participants are unregulated, and the difference in 
means between voluntary regulation and no regulation, for those who are not regulated, is statistically 
significant (t147 = 5.66, p < 0.001). The distributions also differ significantly in a non-parametric rank-sum 
test (z = 4.88, p < 0.001). This finding is consistent with our interpretation that choosing to be 
unregulated, in contrast with regulation being entirely absent, give participants who opt for no regulation 
a “license to cheat” and leads to higher misreporting than when all participants are unregulated. 
4.6. The presence of ethical spillovers 
  Finally, we can explore whether any of our treatments in the first (matrix) task, which differed in 
the extent to which participants were regulated, led to any differences in reported die-roll scores in the 
second task, when all participants were unregulated. That is, does the presence, absence, or voluntary 
nature of regulation in the first task create spillovers to the second task, when regulation does not exist? 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
  Figure 2 reports the distributions of reported die rolls, in task 2, by the preceding regulation 
condition in task 1. Following the mandatory-regulation condition, the mean reported die roll is 3.93, 
which is only slightly higher than the expected mean roll of 3.5, and the difference is not statistically 
significant (t29 = 1.38, p = 0.18). Thus, when everyone in the first task is regulated, behavior is generally 
ethical in the second task, in the sense that there appears to be little misreporting. However, when the first 
task is conducted under either no regulation or under voluntary regulation, mean die rolls are higher: 4.60 
and 4.69, respectively, and these both differ significantly from 3.5 (t29 = 3.65, p = 0.001; t215 = 11.66, p < 
0.001, respectively). 
  Table 8 presents ordered probit regressions of the reported task 2 die-roll score on task 1 
treatment and demographic variables; the omitted category is mandatory regulation, meaning that the 
reported coefficients measure differences with this treatment. In the first column, we find that task 2 
misreporting is significantly higher following the no-regulation and voluntary-regulation conditions. The 
magnitude of misreporting is similar in both conditions; we fail to reject the restriction that the two 
coefficients in the first regression are equal (χ
2(1) = 0.13, p = 0.72). The second model estimates the 
differences separately for each voluntary-regulation condition. We find similar degrees of misreporting in  
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all of the voluntary-regulation conditions; we fail to reject the restriction that all of the coefficients in the 
second model are equal (χ
2(4) = 0.88, p = 0.93). Thus, misreporting in the second (die-roll) task is present 
in all conditions in which participants had the opportunity to misreport in the first (matrix) task, and the 
degree of misreporting is equal across all such conditions. 
Insert Table 8 about here 
  In column 3, we find that misreporting of die-roll scores among those who previously 
experienced voluntary regulation is driven primarily by those who opted for no regulation. Thus, the 
choice not to be regulated in task 1 suggests an individual type that is likely to engage in misreporting, as 
measured by the second (die-roll) task. This might suggest that females – who opt for no regulation and 
appear to misreport scores to a greater extent than males in the first task – might also engage in greater 
misreporting in the second task. The fourth model, however, finds that females do not report higher die-
roll scores than males; in fact, they report slightly lower scores than males (4.41 vs. 4.73). This stands in 
contrast to our results from the first task and suggests that females only exhibit a greater propensity to 
misreport when they are at a disadvantage (in our case, in task 1, because females’ ability is lower than 
that of the males, as measured in the mandatory-regulation condition). We interpret this as evidence that 
females are not necessarily more inclined to misreport than males; otherwise, they likely would do so in 
the die-roll task as well. Instead, it suggests that women (or perhaps any other group) are more likely to 
opt for the opportunity to engage in misreporting when they are at a competitive disadvantage in order to 
make up for the disadvantage. Therefore, in task 1, when women were at a disadvantage, they chose to 
self-grade and engaged in more misreporting. However, in the die-roll task, in which everyone was on 
equal competitive footing, this greater willingness to misreport disappears. 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper, we studied what happens when individuals can avoid or circumvent regulation and 
monitoring intended to curb unethical conduct. This ability effectively makes regulation voluntary. We 
compare our results against the null hypothesis that voluntary regulation should have similar effects as the 
complete absence of regulation. 
Consistent with other research (e.g., Gibson, et al., forthcoming; Gneezy, 2005; Gino et al., 2009; 
Mazar et al., 2008), we find that participants in a condition in which regulation is entirely absent report 
higher scores than when all scores are verified, though they do not fully exploit their ability to lie. 
However, we also find that when participants must first voluntarily decide whether to have their scores 
regulated, a significant proportion of participants opt for regulation, yet net misreporting is higher. We 
find evidence that those who opt for no regulation tend to be those who are likely to perform worse at the  
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competitive task and that the act of opting for no regulation induces greater misreporting – i.e., it provides 
individuals with a license to cheat to a greater extent. 
  In examining potential explanations for our pattern of findings, we highlighted an additional set 
of results. In the first (matrix) task, we observed a significant difference in baseline (regulated) 
performance among men and women; men performed better at the task. We also observed that women 
opted for less regulation when it was voluntary and also appeared to engage in more misreporting. Thus, 
an observable characteristic, gender, accounted for who did worse with no misreporting, who opted for 
less regulation, and who engaged in more misreporting. Yet, women did not misreport more frequently on 
a second task that did not involve competition based on ability. Our work is therefore related to previous 
research in economics that examines the link between gender and competition. For instance, Gneezy et al. 
(2003) found that women do not increase their effort as systematically as men in competitive settings. 
Similarly, Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) found that boys responded more strongly than girls to 
competition.
9 Furthermore, related work demonstrates women are less likely to opt for competition than 
men are (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). At first impression, our work can be interpreted as evidence 
that, when faced with the possibility of avoiding direct competition and instead misreporting one’s score, 
women do so more than men. Thus, one might view the gender differences we find in the first (matrix) 
task as evidence that women circumvent competition by engaging in cheating. 
  However, we find that there is no higher disposition to misreport among women in the second 
(die-roll) task. Therefore, our findings are subtler than simply “women cheat more on competitive tasks.” 
Instead, we interpret our findings as evidence that, in competitive situations, disadvantaged groups will be 
more likely to forgo regulation to eliminate their competitive disadvantage. Thus, the greater avoidance of 
regulation and misreporting by women appears to be context-specific and limited to environments in 
which women are competitively disadvantaged. In this vein, our results share features with recent findings 
by Schwieren and Weichselbaumer (2010), who found that women engaged in cheating behavior more 
often than men, but that this was less related to a gender difference than to differences in ability.  
Our results yield important policy implications. First, we demonstrate that regulation that can be 
avoided produces more unethical conduct than simply an absence of regulation does. This counter-
intuitive finding results from greater misreporting when individuals opt for the ability to misreport than 
when it is simply given to them. Thus, giving individuals or firms the ability to influence the degree of 
regulation or monitoring to which they are subject may perversely encourage those who choose lax 
regulations to behave more unethically than if no regulation were present. The fact that some individuals 
choose to open offshore bank accounts that allow them to hide earnings from tax authorities may lead 
them to subsequently hide earnings to a greater extent than they would if they could do so by law with all 
                                                 
9 But, see also Dreber, von Essen, and Ranehill (2011) for contrasting results.  
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bank accounts. Similarly, giving employees or students the discretion of whether to have their behavior 
monitored or verified may yield more unethical conduct. For instance, an employee who chooses a job in 
which their hourly effort is not monitored over one with stricter monitoring may in turn exert less effort as 
a consequence of this initial choice. Broadly, our results suggest the need to think carefully about the 
possibility that easily avoidable regulation may yield outcomes that are worse than simply having no 
regulation.  
  Our results also suggest that, in competitive situations, those who seek to avoid regulation may be 
those who are competitively disadvantaged in the underlying domain. Conversely, those who feel more 
confident in their ability to win without misreporting may opt to be regulated, perhaps out of a 
willingness to signal to outsiders that they do not need to cheat. Thus, voluntary regulation has the 
interesting property of allowing those who are disadvantaged a greater opportunity to catch up to those 
with greater skill. This is particularly true in contexts where there is no outside pressure to adopt 
regulation (as in our private treatments). 
  We also find some interventions that can be used to influence the willingness to abide by 
regulation. Making regulation choices public increases the adoption of voluntary regulation. Having early 
movers opt for regulation also influences those who make choices subsequently. Thus, a policymaker 
interested in obtaining compliance with regulation may be able to rely on social influences to achieve this 
result. 
  Finally, an important open question deals with how our results translate to other settings. For 
example, we use a competitive task, for reasons we describe earlier in the paper. But it is not transparent 
that our results would also be obtained in contexts in which individuals are not competing, as is the case, 
for example, under piece-rate compensation. In such contexts, the importance of relative skill is likely to 
be weaker, diminishing the need for the disadvantaged group to opt for less regulation and engage in more 
misreporting. Nevertheless, our context is similar to that in many economics and organizational settings, 
where success is based on relative performance and where individuals or firms can select among varying 
degrees of transparency. Our findings suggest that, at least in some such contexts, the possibility of 
voluntary regulation can yield perverse outcomes. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Experimental design overview  
  Voluntary Regulation    Mandatory 
  Sequential 
Choice 
Simultaneous 
Choice    Regulation  No Regulation 
Public Choice 
 
N = 54 
(9 sessions) 
 
N = 54 
(9 sessions)   
 
N = 30 
(5 sessions) 
 
N = 30 
(5 sessions) 
Private Choice  N = 54 
(9 sessions) 
N = 54
(9 sessions)     
 
 
Table 2. Outcomes from the matrix task by condition 
Treatment  Mean score 
(std. dev.) 
Frequency of 
regulation 
No Regulation  9.07 (3.78)  0 
Mandatory Regulation  5.40 (4.00)  1 
Voluntary Regulation (Pooled - all conditions)  12.20 (5.67)  0.421 
Voluntary Regulation (Private-Simultaneous)  13.48 (5.55)  0.296 
Voluntary Regulation (Private-Sequential)  13.67 (5.65)  0.333 
Voluntary Regulation (Public-Simultaneous)  10.26 (5.51)  0.537 
Voluntary Regulation (Public-Sequential)  11.39 (5.37)  0.519 
  
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
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Table 3. Endogenous regulation choices by position (ID) in sequential-public condition 
  Session 
ID  S2  S9  S10  S31 S7 S19  S22  S26 S43 
1  1  1  1  1 0 0 0 0 0 
2  1  1  1  1 0 0 0 0 0 
3  1  1  1  1 0 0 1 1 0 
4  1  1  1  1 0 0 0 1 0 
5  0  1  1  0 0 1 1 1 0 
6  0  1  1  0 1 0 0 1 0 
Frequency of 
regulation  0.67  1.00  1.00  0.67 0.17 0.17 0.33 0.67 0.00 
Average reported 
score  10.2  8.0  9.5  11.0 14.3 14.8  8.5  9.8 16.3 
Average score 
(excluding ID#1)  11.0  8.6  10.2  11.8 13.2 13.8  8.6  8.2 16.2 
Note: Decisions to be regulated are marked 1 and decisions to be unregulated are marked 0. Columns in gray are 
those where the first subject (id=1) chose to be regulated. 
 
 
Table 4. Mean reported matrix score broken down by regulation condition 
  Mean reported Score 
Treatment  Unregulated 
Participants 
Regulated 
Participants 
No Regulation  9.07 (3.78)   
Mandatory Regulation    5.40 (4.00) 
Voluntary Regulation (Pooled – all conditions)  14.94 (4.98)  8.43 (4.20) 
Voluntary Regulation (Private-Simultaneous)  16.00 (4.13)  7.50 (3.56) 
Voluntary Regulation (Private-Sequential)  16.28 (4.03)  8.44 (4.76) 
Voluntary Regulation (Public-Simultaneous)  11.92 (5.95)  8.83 (4.75) 
Voluntary Regulation (Public-Sequential)  14.46 (5.25)  8.54 (3.68) 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
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Table 5. Marginal effects from probit regression of decision to be regulated 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: * p<0.10, **  p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 and standard errors are clustered by session and in the parentheses. 
Variables 1.  2. 
Female  -0.172
** 
(0.067) 
-0.192
*** 
(0.064) 
Age  0.011 
(0.009) 
0.010 
(0.009) 
Parent Graduated College  0.076 
(0.066) 
0.075 
(0.069) 
Religious  -0.098 
(0.111) 
-0.067 
(0.138) 
Public Treatment  0.242
*** 
(0.079) 
0.249
*** 
(0.076) 
Major (Arts & Humanities)    0.125 
(0.180) 
Major (Business Administration)    0.001 
(0.148) 
Major (Economics)    0.015 
(0.206) 
Major (Engineering)    -0.026 
(0.116) 
Major (Sciences)    -0.048 
(0.113) 
Major (Social Sciences)    0.039 
(0.164) 
    
Observations 212  211 
Pseudo R
2 0.069  0.072 
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Table 6. Mean matrix score by gender and treatment 
Treatment 
Mean 
score 
(males) 
Mean 
score 
(females) 
Difference 
(male – female) 
No Regulation  8.57  
(3.29) 
9.90 
(4.70)  -1.33  t22 = 0.82 
p = 0.42 
Mandatory Regulation  6.94 
(4.20) 
3.64 
(3.00)  3.30  t28 = 2.44 
p = 0.02 
Voluntary Regulation (Pooled - Private treatments) 13.90 
(5.41) 
13.05 
(5.87)  0.85  t106 = 0.76 
p = 0.45 
Voluntary Regulation (Pooled - Public treatments)  12.19 
(5.45) 
9.18 
(5.02)  3.00  t106 = 2.95 
p = 0.004 
Voluntary Regulation (Private-Simultaneous)  13.30 
(5.14) 
13.88 
(6.51)  -0.58  t52 = 0.36 
t = 0.72 
Voluntary Regulation (Private-Sequential)  14.63 
(5.71) 
12.46 
(5.44)  2.17  t52 = 1.42 
p = 0.16 
Voluntary Regulation (Public-Simultaneous)  11.76 
(5.96) 
7.90 
(3.77)  3.86  t52 = 2.64 
p = 0.01 
Voluntary Regulation (Public-Sequential)  12.73 
(4.79) 
10.14 
(5.65)  2.59  t52 = 1.81 
p = 0.08 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 7. Mean difference between reported and predicted matrix scores in competitive task by 
condition 
Treatment  Unregulated 
participants 
Regulated 
participants 
No Regulation  3.56 (4.50)   
Voluntary Regulation (Pooled – all conditions)  9.56 (4.81)  2.61 (3.84) 
Voluntary Regulation (Private-Simultaneous)  10.19 (4.58)  1.39 (3.23) 
Voluntary Regulation (Private-Sequential)  10.99 (3.71)  2.61 (4.33) 
Voluntary Regulation (Public-Simultaneous)  6.56 (5.32)  2.91 (4.49) 
Voluntary Regulation (Public-Sequential)  9.55 (4.93)  3.01 (3.09) 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 8. Ordered probit regressions of reported score in die-roll task 
Variables  1. 2. 3. 4. 
No Regulation in Task 1  0.47
* 
(0.24) 
0.47
* 
(0.24) 
0.47
* 
(0.24) 
0.45 
(0.27) 
Voluntary Regulation in Task 1 
(all conditions) 
0.53
*** 
(0.19)    0.28 
(0.20) 
0.24 
(0.19) 
Voluntary Regulation in Task 1 
(chose no regulation)      0.48
*** 
(0.15) 
0.52
*** 
(0.14) 
Voluntary Regulation in Task 1 
(Private-Simultaneous)    0.51
** 
(0.26)     
Voluntary Regulation in Task 1 
(Private-Sequential)    0.61
*** 
(0.21)     
Voluntary Regulation in Task 1 
(Public-Simultaneous)    0.45
* 
(0.25)     
Voluntary Regulation in Task 1 
(Public-Sequential)    0.56
*** 
(0.22)     
Female        -0.28
** 
(0.14) 
Observations  276  276  276  270 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The standard errors (clustered by session) are reported in the parentheses. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Reported matrix score for those choosing to be un/regulated by private and public 
conditions 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Reported die-roll score (Task 2) by regulation condition (in Task 1) 
 
 